A Minsk Ucraina, Russia ed OSCE hanno siglato un’intesa per il cessate il fuoco. L’obiettivo finale è quello di realizzare un piano di pace in 14 punti. I rappresentanti dei separatisti filo-russi erano presenti con uno status simile a qualcosa come osservatori. Kiev non ha così avuto necessità di riconoscerli formalmente.
PIANO PACE Poroshenko
“We Europeans must learn a lesson from the tragic Polish September, from the tragic years of the Second World War – tragic for all people without exception – that we cannot be naively optimistic. Today, looking at the tragedy of the Ukrainians, looking at the war – be1cause we need to use that word – we know that September 1939 cannot be allowed to be repeated” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
NATO member states will work towards “a new policy, whose main objective will be the security and effectiveness of our western community against the threat of war, not only in eastern Ukraine.”
It was on Gdansk’s small Westerplatte peninsula that the first shots of World War II were fired, with a small detachment of Polish soldiers attempting to withhold a siege from Nazi Germany.
Polish and German presidents Bronislaw Komorowski and Joachim Gauck met for the commemoration.
In view of the situation in Ukraine, the Federal Council has today decided to take further measures to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions. It has amended the Ordinance of 2 April 2014 on measures to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions in relation to the situation in Ukraine to include the sanctions imposed by the EU in July. The revised ordinance enters into force at 6 pm today.
During its discussions on the situation in Ukraine of 13 August 2014, the Federal Council decided to widen its current policy and to take all the measures required to ensure that the most recent sanctions imposed by the European Union cannot be circumvented via Swiss territory. Today the Federal Council decided on the necessary measures.
In the field of finance, issues of long term financial instruments by five Russian banks will be made subject to authorisation. In future, authorisation for new issues will only be granted if they are within the average financial engagement of the past three years. The subsidiaries of these Russian banks in Switzerland are exempt from the authorisation requirement as long as they are not acting on behalf of, or on the instructions of their parent companies. The EU’s restrictive measures also allow a similar exemption for subsidiaries of the Russian banks in question on its territory. Secondary trading in financial instruments newly issued outside Switzerland and the EU will be subject to a duty to notify. Eleven names have been added to the existing list of natural persons and businesses with whom financial intermediaries are prohibited from entering into new business relationships and whose existing business relations are subject to a duty to notify.
With regard to specific military goods and dual-use goods subject to licence, the Federal Council decided to add a further criterion for rejecting the application for an export licence to the existing list of criteria in goods control legislation. An application may now be refused if goods are intended to be used exclusively or partially for military purposes, or if they are intended for a military end user. With regard to war material, the Federal Council decided that a ban on imports of such goods from Russia and Ukraine should apply. The Federal Council also decided to introduce a duty to notify for exports of certain goods used in the extraction of oil in deep sea, Arctic or shale gas projects in Russia.
As a result of Switzerland’s decision not to recognise the annexation of Crimea by Russia constituing a breach of international law, the Federal Council has imposed a ban on imports and a ban on exports of certain key goods used in the extraction of oil and gas, as well as restrictions on investments for Crimea and Sevastopol.
The Federal Council has acknowledged the measures taken by Russia in respect of agricultural goods. It stresses that Switzerland is not engaged in any state measures to promote additional Swiss exports to Russia.
The Federal Council continues to monitor the situation in Ukraine closely and reserves the right to take further measures depending on how the situation develops.
Il tempo delle operazioni militari sta finendo per l’avvicinarsi dell’inverno; è venuta l’ora di una tregua fra gli ucraini; Mosca si prepari ad un serio negoziato.
È questo il messaggio recapitato a Kiev personalmente da Angela Merkel prima del summit a Minsk tra europei ed ex sovietici. In estrema sintesi, le parti in causa facciano un passo indietro e diano una chance alla pace. I presidenti russo Putin e ucraino Poroshenko avranno l’occasione di parlarsi a quattr’occhi o alla presenza di mediatori. Che sfruttino l’occasione!
La cancelliera tedesca è stata chiarissima. Primo: l’Ucraina ha bisogno di “decentralizzare i poteri dello Stato” in modo da fornire garanzie alle regioni dell’Est, popolate da una maggioranza russofona. Secondo: Berlino e l’Unione europea doneranno “500 milioni di euro per l’immediata ricostruzione”. Terzo: non verrà riconosciuta l’annessione della Crimea da parte del Cremlino. Quarto: se la situazione non migliorerà rapidamente “non sono escluse nuove sanzioni” contro la Russia, alla quale non verranno fatte concessioni, poiché la crisi è troppo pericolosa. Nelle settimane passate la Merkel ha definito Putin un uomo che vive “in un altro mondo”.
Berlino è in realtà preoccupata che con l’approssimarsi della stagione fredda Mosca possa iniziare a giocare con le forniture del gas. L’Unione europea dipende per un 30% circa del suo fabbisogno dalla russa Gazprom. Approssimativamente l’80% di questi approvvigionamenti transitano in Ucraina. Per ora le reazioni anti-occidentali del Cremlino sono state spuntate e ad uso della propaganda interna.
Sul piano militare i governativi di Kiev hanno riconquistato gran parte delle due regioni ribelli, costringendo i separatisti ad asserragliarsi nelle tre città di Donetsk, Gorlovka e Lugansk. Non riescono per ora solo a sigillare la frontiera per evitare l’arrivo di uomini freschi e armi in soccorso.
Kiev non pare, tuttavia, avere unità speciali sufficienti per snidare in fretta nei centri urbani quelle poche migliaia di guerriglieri delle due Repubbliche popolari presenti.
E il tempo, adesso, gioca contro di lei: l’autunno e il rigido inverno sono alle porte. Gran parte della popolazione è fuggita dalle zone del conflitto: la sua stragrande maggioranza è ospite di parenti o amici; in percentuale in pochi sono nei campi profughi. Le vacanze, forzatamente cominciate a giugno, devono finire, anche perché i soldi iniziano a scarseggiare.
La gente, sia a Lugansk che a Donetsk, non ne può più: vuole la fine della guerra civile. I pochi che avevano dimostrato supporto per i separatisti, si sono diradati. I ribelli stanno distruggendo le infrastrutture per provocare una crisi umanitaria, che, per il momento, non esiste a Donetsk, ma si intravede a Lugansk città. Quella è una delle poche carte restate loro in mano.
A Minsk, in conclusione, vi sarà il tentativo di trovare una soluzione, facendo uscire tutti dalla crisi con la faccia pulita…o quasi.
Giuseppe D’Amato
23 августа 1939 года гитлеровская Германия и Советский Союз заключили договор о ненападении. Со стороны СССР его подписал нарком по иностранным делам Вячеслав Молотов, со стороны Германии – министр иностранных дел Иоахим фон Риббентроп (Joachim von Ribbentrop). К договору прилагался секретный дополнительный протокол о разграничении сфер обоюдных интересов в Восточной Европе.
Неделю спустя – 1 сентября 1939 года – Германия вторглась на территорию Польши, а 17 сентября 1939 года на территорию Польши вошли советские войска. Позже к СССР были присоединены страны Балтии, Бессарабия, Северная Буковина и часть Финляндии.
Этот договор обычно называют “пактом Молотова-Риббентропа”, а в Германии – “пактом Гитлера-Сталина” (Hitler-Stalin-Pakt).
День памяти
После нападения Германии на Советский Союз 22 июня 1941 года “пакт Молотова-Риббентропа”, так же как и все остальные советско-германские договоры, утратил силу.
В 1989 году Съезд народных депутатов СССР осудил секретный дополнительный протокол к договору и признал его недействительным с момента подписания. С недавнего времени 23 августа является Днем памяти жертв сталинизма и нацизма.
Deutsche Welle
La tragedia dell’irresponsabilità delle leadership, degli Stati che perdono il loro ruolo guida nella comunità internazionale, dei nuovi membri Ue che utilizzano la “casa comune europea” come un condominio per saldare vecchi conti col passato sovietico. Queste sono solo alcune delle componenti che hanno concorso a provocare l’abbattimento del Boeing malese oltre al permesso di far volare un aereo civile sopra ad una zona di guerra.
Adesso siamo di fronte al classico “casus belli”. Proprio nell’anno in cui si è ricordato con terrore l’attentato del 28 giugno 1914 a Sarajevo. Un incendio, per ora limitato ad un paio di regioni, potrebbe diventare gigantesco se chi di dovere non si ergerà a pompiere.
La guerra del Donbass e di Lugansk, nella terribile realtà dei fatti, non interessa quasi a nessuno. Era già un conflitto dimenticato dai grandi mass media mondiali. La Russia ha perso da un pezzo la partita di creare la “Novaja Rossija”, una fascia che dal suo confine arriva fino ad Odessa. Gli occidentali tremano invece al pensiero di iniziare a spedire miliardi in serie per riconvertire un’economia locale non concorrenziale con i livelli europei. Restano solo i governativi ucraini che a fatica non riescono ad avere la meglio di 10-12mila miliziani, rafforzati da abili professionisti venuti da fuori.
Ora il dramma del Boeing, proprio mentre la diplomazia attendeva stancamente il ritorno del Donbass e di Lugansk sotto l’egida di Kiev per aprire il vero negoziato.
Il nocciolo del problema è rappresentato dal futuro della Crimea, dai rapporti russo-ucraini, da quelli russo-europei ed americani. Che cosa si vuole fare? Isolare Mosca?
L’obiettivo finale, ci raccontavano diplomatici occidentali, è quello di ridimensionare la Russia geopoliticamente ed economicamente. Il progetto euroasiatico – Europa più Russia – per il mondo globalizzato del XXI secolo è fallito. Ecco perché il Cremlino ha volto lo sguardo verso la Cina, che timorosamente ha accettato il corteggiamento, non dimenticando tuttavia la sua complessa relazione con gli Stati Uniti. Le forniture russe al Vecchio Continente nell’arco di 2-3 anni verranno ridotte a vantaggio degli approvvigionamenti di “shale” gas e petrolio americano. Immaginabili le conseguenze per il budget di Mosca!
Al momento solo tanta intelligenza e calma servono per uscire da questa complicatissima situazione. L’immediata tregua fra le parti in conflitto e l’inizio di serie trattative appaiono indispensabili. Ma per evitare di discutere sul nulla sono necessari atti politici da parte di Kiev con la definizione di un documento – da far entrare nella futura Costituzione – in cui vengano definiti i poteri delle autonomie locali e vengano accordate garanzie sull’uso delle lingue.
Ma perché poi la Nato non dichiara una volta per tutte che l’Ucraina non sarà suo membro per i prossimi 50 anni? E che i suoi piani anti-missilistici in Europa coinvolgeranno in futuro anche la Russia, non appena raggiungerà livelli più democratici interni?
A Vladimir Putin non resterà così che prendere atto che il mondo con le sfere di influenza non esiste più.
Giuseppe D’Amato
Ukraine-related Sanctions; Publication of Executive Order 13662 Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List
7/16/2014
Today, OFAC is introducing the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List to identify persons operating in sectors of the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directives found within the list describe prohibitions on dealings with the persons identified.
Specially Designated Nationals List Update
In addition, the following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
BESEDA, Sergey (a.k.a. BESEDA, Sergei; a.k.a. BESEDA, Sergei Orestovoch); DOB 1954; Commander of the Fifth Service of the FSB; Commander of the Service for Operational Information and International Communications of the FSB; FSB Colonel General; Colonel-General (individual) [UKRAINE2].
BORODAI, Aleksandr (a.k.a. BORODAI, Alexander); DOB 25 Jul 1972; nationality Russia (individual) [UKRAINE].
NEVEROV, Sergei Ivanovich (a.k.a. NEVEROV, Sergei; a.k.a. NEVEROV, Sergey); DOB 21 Dec 1961; POB Tashtagol, Russia; Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation; Member of the State Duma Committee on Housing Policy and Housing and Communal Services (individual) [UKRAINE2].
SAVELYEV, Oleg Genrikhovich; DOB 27 Oct 1965; POB St. Petersburg, Russia; Minister for Crimean Affairs (individual) [UKRAINE2].
SHCHEGOLEV, Igor (a.k.a. SHCHYOGOLEV, Igor Olegovich); DOB 10 Nov 1965; POB Vinnitsa, Ukraine; alt. POB Vinnytsia, Ukraine; Aide to the President of the Russian Federation (individual) [UKRAINE2].
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, Donetsk Region, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT (a.k.a. FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE, STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT; a.k.a. FSUE SRPE BAZALT; a.k.a. STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT), 32 Velyaminovskaya, Moscow 105318, Russia; Website www.bazalt.ru; Email Address moscow@bazalt.ru [UKRAINE2].
FEODOSIYA ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. FEODOSIA OIL PRODUCTS SUPPLY CO.; a.k.a. FEODOSIYA ENTERPRISE ON PROVIDING OIL PRODUCTS; a.k.a. FEODOSIYSKE COMPANY FOR THE OIL; a.k.a. THEODOSIYA OIL TERMINAL), Feodosiya, Geologicheskaya str. 2, Crimea 98107, Ukraine; Feodosia, Str. Geological 2, Crimea 98107, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN RADIO-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES (a.k.a. CONCERN RADIO-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES; a.k.a. “KRET”), 20/1 Korp. 1 ul. Goncharnaya, Moscow 109240, Russia; Website http://www.kret.com; Registration ID 1097746084666 [UKRAINE2].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN SOZVEZDIE (a.k.a. JSC CONCERN SOZVEZDIE), 14 Plekhanovskaya Street, Voronezh, Russia; 14 ul. Plekhanovskaya, Voronezh, Voronezhskaya obl. 394018, Russia; Registration ID 1053600445337 [UKRAINE2].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA (a.k.a. JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CONSORTIUM NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA; a.k.a. JSC MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA; a.k.a. MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA JSC; a.k.a. MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIYA JSC; a.k.a. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION NPO MASHINOSTROENIA OAO; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION MACHINE BUILDING ASSOCIATION; a.k.a. VOENNO-PROMYSHLENNAYA KORPORATSIYA NAUCHNO-PROIZVODSTVENNOE OBEDINENIE MASHINOSTROENIYA OAO; a.k.a. VPK NPO MASHINOSTROENIYA), 33, Gagarina St., Reutov-town, Moscow Region 143966, Russia; 33 Gagarin Street, Reutov, Moscow Region 143966, Russia; 33 Gagarina ul., Reutov, Moskovskaya obl 143966, Russia; Website www.npomash.ru; Email Address export@npomash.ru; alt. Email Address vpk@npomash.ru; Registration ID 1075012001492 (Russia); Tax ID No. 5012039795 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 07501739 (Russia) [UKRAINE2].
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY (a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY CORP; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY DEFENSE CORPORATION; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY JSC; f.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO KONTSERN PVO ALMAZ ANTEI), 41 ul.Vereiskaya, Moscow 121471, Russia; Website almaz-antey.ru; Email Address antey@almaz-antey.ru [UKRAINE2].
KALASHNIKOV CONCERN (a.k.a. CONCERN KALASHNIKOV; a.k.a. IZHEVSKIY MASHINOSTROITEL’NYI ZAVOD OAO; f.k.a. IZHMASH R&D CENTER; f.k.a. JSC NPO IZHMASH; f.k.a. NPO IZHMASH OAO; a.k.a. OJSC CONCERN KALASHNIKOV; f.k.a. OJSC IZHMASH; f.k.a. SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION IZHMASH JOINT STOCK COMPANY), 3, Derjabin Pr., Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic 426006, Russia; Registration ID 1111832003018 [UKRAINE2].
KONSTRUKTORSKOE BYURO PRIBOROSTROENIYA OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO (a.k.a. INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. JSC KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU JOINT STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. “KBP OAO”), 59 Shcheglovskaya Zaseka ul., Tula 300001, Russia; Website www.kbptula.ru; Email Address kbkedr@tula.net; Registration ID 1117154036911 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 07515747 (Russia) [UKRAINE2].
LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC (a.k.a. LUGANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC; a.k.a. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF LUHANSK), Luhansk Region, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
URALVAGONZAVOD (a.k.a. NAUCHNO-PROIZVODSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. NPK URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. NPK URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. OJSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. URALVAGONZAVOD CORPORATION; a.k.a. “UVZ”), 28, Vostochnoye shosse, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk region 622007, Russia; 28 Vostochnoe shosse, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovskaya oblast 622007, Russia; 40, Bolshaya Yakimanka Street, Moscow 119049, Russia; Vistochnoye Shosse, 28, Nizhny Tagil 622007, Russia; Website http://www.uvz.ru/; alt. Website http://uralvagonzavod.com/; Email Address web@uvz.ru [UKRAINE2].
Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List Update
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List:
GAZPROMBANK OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; Email Address mailbox@gazprombank.ru; Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497; Government Gazette Number 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662].
OAO NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO-INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. NOVATEK), 2, Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22 A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion, Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email Address novatek@novatek.ru; Registration ID 1026303117642 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 33556474 (Russia) [UKRAINE-EO13662].
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Moscow 115035, Russia; Website www.rosneft.com; alt. Website www.rosneft.ru; Email Address postman@rosneft.ru; Registration ID 1027700043502 (Russia); Tax ID No. 7706107510 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 00044428 (Russia) [UKRAINE-EO13662].
VNESHECONOMBANK (a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA; a.k.a. “VEB”), 9 Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Moscow 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM; Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address info@veb.ru; BIK (RU) 044525060 [UKRAINE-EO13662].
1. Гарантии безопасности для всех участников переговоров.
2. Освобождение от уголовной ответственности тех, кто сложил оружие и не совершил тяжких преступлений.
3. Освобождение заложников.
4. Создание 10 км буферной зоны на российско-украинской государственной границе. Вывод незаконных вооруженных формирований.
5. Гарантированный коридор для выхода российских и украинских наемников.
6. Разоружение.
7. Создание в структуре МВД подразделений для осуществления совместного патрулирования.
8. Освобождение незаконно удерживаемых административных зданий в Донецкой и Луганской областях.
9. Возобновление деятельности местных органов власти.
10. Обновление центрального теле- и радиовещания в Донецкой и Луганской областях.
11. Децентрализация власти (путем избрания исполкомов, защита русского языка, проект изменений в Конституцию).
12. Согласование губернаторов до выборов с представителями Донбасса (при условии согласования единой кандидатуры, при разногласиях – решение принимает Президент).
13. Досрочные местные и парламентские выборы.
14. Программа создания рабочих мест в регионе.
15. Восстановление объектов промышленности и социальной инфраструктуры
Опрос Левада-центра 23-26 мая 2014 г., данные Фридом Хауза и МВФ.
Таблица 1. КАКИЕ ПЯТЬ СТРАН ВЫ НАЗВАЛИ БЫ НАИБОЛЕЕ НЕДРУЖЕСТВЕННО, ВРАЖДЕБНО НАСТРОЕННЫМИ ПО ОТНОШЕНИЮ К РОССИИ? (несколько вариантов ответа; ответы ранжированы по последнему замеру)
Страны | Процент полученных голосов, 2014 | Индекс политической свободы, 2014 | ВВП на душу населения, дол. по ППС, 2013 | |
1 | США | 69 | 92 | 53101 |
2 | Украина | 30 | 55 | 7423 |
3 | Литва | 24 | 90 | 22747 |
4 | Латвия | 23 | 84 | 19120 |
5 | Эстония | 21 | 95 | 23144 |
6 | Грузия | 19 | 60 | 6145 |
7 | Великобритания | 18 | 97 | 37307 |
В среднем (среднее арифметическое) | 82 | 24141 |
Таблица 2. НАЗОВИТЕ ПЯТЬ СТРАН, КОТОРЫЕ ВЫ МОГЛИ БЫ НАЗВАТЬ НАИБОЛЕЕ БЛИЗКИМИ ДРУЗЬЯМИ, СОЮЗНИКАМИ РОССИИ? (несколько вариантов ответа; ответы ранжированы по последнему замеру)
Страны | Процент полученных голосов, 2014 | Индекс политической свободы, 2014 | ВВП на душу населения, дол. по ППС, 2013 | |
1 | Беларусь | 51 | 14 | 15753 |
2 | Китай | 40 | 17 | 9844 |
3 | Казахстан | 37 | 25 | 14391 |
4 | Армения | 15 | 43 | 6191 |
5 | Индия | 13 | 77 | 4077 |
6 | Куба | 10 | 11 | 5008 |
7 | Азербайджан | 9 | 22 | 11044 |
В среднем (среднее арифметическое) | 30 | 9473 |
Источники:
http://www.levada.ru/05-06-2014/otnoshen
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freed
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2
Ровно пять лет назад, в мае 2009 г., Левада-центр проводил аналогичное исследование.
Какие изменения случились в составах «врагов» и «друзей» за эти прошедшие пять лет, в показателях их Индексов политических свобод и в величинах их уровней экономического развития?
Основные составы «врагов» и «друзей» мало изменились. Лишь из числа первых семи «врагов» выпала Польша, вместо нее появилась Великобритания. Список же первых семи «друзей» покинула Германия, но в нем появился Азербайджан.
Таблица 3. Средние (арифметические) значения для 7 «врагов» и 7 «друзей» России по опросам Левада-центра в 2009 и 2014 гг., по данным Фридом Хауза и МВФ.
Индекс политической свободы | ВВП на душу населения в дол. по ППС | ||||
2009 | 2014 | Изменение, % | 2009 | 2014 | Изменение, % |
Семь «врагов» России | |||||
83 | 82 | -1,9 | 15392 | 24141 | +56,8 |
Семь «друзей» России | |||||
40 | 30 | -25,4 | 10442 | 9473 | -9,3 |
«Семь друзей» России в процентах к «семи врагам» России | |||||
47,9 | 36,5 | -11,5 | 67,8 | 39,2 | -28,6 |
Таким образом, за пять прошедших лет (2009-2014 гг.) среднее значение Индекса политических свобод для семи «врагов» России практически не изменилось (уменьшение Индекса – с 83 до 82), а величина ВВП на душу населения для них выросла почти на 57% (с 15392 до 24141 дол.).
Для семи «друзей» России среднее значение Индекса политических свобод упало более чем на четверть (падение Индекса – с 40 до 30), а величина ВВП на душу населения для них уменьшилась почти на 10% (с 10442 до 9473 дол.)
В результате отставание «семи друзей» России от «семи врагов» России за пять лет заметно увеличилось.
Если по Индексу политических свобод «семь друзей» отставали от «семи врагов» в 2009 г. примерно вдвое (средний уровень Индекса «друзей» – 47,9% от Индекса «врагов»), то в 2014 г. они отставали уже примерно втрое (36,5%).
Если по ВВП на душу населения «семь друзей» отставали от «семи врагов» в 2009 г. примерно на треть (среднее значение ВВП на душу населения – 67,9%), то в 2014 г. российские «друзья» отставали от российских «врагов» уже в два с половиной раза (39,2%).
Таким образом, в результате эффективной пропаганды жители нынешней России не только все более ориентируются на более отсталые в экономическом и несвободные политическом отношении страны мира, но и противопоставляют себя наиболее развитой в экономическом и наиболее свободной в политическом отношениях части мира.
On 19 June 2014 the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Ukraine) List 2014 (the Ukraine List) commenced.
The Ukraine List gives effect to announcements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 19 March and 21 May 2014 to impose targeted financial sanctions and travel bans against persons and entities responsible for, or complicit in, the Russian threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The 50 persons and 11 entities named in Schedule 1 of the Ukraine List satisfy the criteria in regulation 6 of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 to be designated for targeted financial sanctions or declared for travel bans. The details of these persons and entities have been published in the DFAT Consolidated List.
Further information: Ukraine sanctions page
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