Ukraine
La tragedia dell’irresponsabilità delle leadership, degli Stati che perdono il loro ruolo guida nella comunità internazionale, dei nuovi membri Ue che utilizzano la “casa comune europea” come un condominio per saldare vecchi conti col passato sovietico. Queste sono solo alcune delle componenti che hanno concorso a provocare l’abbattimento del Boeing malese oltre al permesso di far volare un aereo civile sopra ad una zona di guerra. 
Adesso siamo di fronte al classico “casus belli”. Proprio nell’anno in cui si è ricordato con terrore l’attentato del 28 giugno 1914 a Sarajevo. Un incendio, per ora limitato ad un paio di regioni, potrebbe diventare gigantesco se chi di dovere non si ergerà a pompiere.
La guerra del Donbass e di Lugansk, nella terribile realtà dei fatti, non interessa quasi a nessuno. Era già un conflitto dimenticato dai grandi mass media mondiali. La Russia ha perso da un pezzo la partita di creare la “Novaja Rossija”, una fascia che dal suo confine arriva fino ad Odessa. Gli occidentali tremano invece al pensiero di iniziare a spedire miliardi in serie per riconvertire un’economia locale non concorrenziale con i livelli europei. Restano solo i governativi ucraini che a fatica non riescono ad avere la meglio di 10-12mila miliziani, rafforzati da abili professionisti venuti da fuori.
Ora il dramma del Boeing, proprio mentre la diplomazia attendeva stancamente il ritorno del Donbass e di Lugansk sotto l’egida di Kiev per aprire il vero negoziato.
Il nocciolo del problema è rappresentato dal futuro della Crimea, dai rapporti russo-ucraini, da quelli russo-europei ed americani. Che cosa si vuole fare? Isolare Mosca?
L’obiettivo finale, ci raccontavano diplomatici occidentali, è quello di ridimensionare la Russia geopoliticamente ed economicamente. Il progetto euroasiatico – Europa più Russia – per il mondo globalizzato del XXI secolo è fallito. Ecco perché il Cremlino ha volto lo sguardo verso la Cina, che timorosamente ha accettato il corteggiamento, non dimenticando tuttavia la sua complessa relazione con gli Stati Uniti. Le forniture russe al Vecchio Continente nell’arco di 2-3 anni verranno ridotte a vantaggio degli approvvigionamenti di “shale” gas e petrolio americano. Immaginabili le conseguenze per il budget di Mosca!
Al momento solo tanta intelligenza e calma servono per uscire da questa complicatissima situazione. L’immediata tregua fra le parti in conflitto e l’inizio di serie trattative appaiono indispensabili. Ma per evitare di discutere sul nulla sono necessari atti politici da parte di Kiev con la definizione di un documento – da far entrare nella futura Costituzione – in cui vengano definiti i poteri delle autonomie locali e vengano accordate garanzie sull’uso delle lingue.
Ma perché poi la Nato non dichiara una volta per tutte che l’Ucraina non sarà suo membro per i prossimi 50 anni? E che i suoi piani anti-missilistici in Europa coinvolgeranno in futuro anche la Russia, non appena raggiungerà livelli più democratici interni?
A Vladimir Putin non resterà così che prendere atto che il mondo con le sfere di influenza non esiste più.
Giuseppe D’Amato
Ukraine-related Sanctions; Publication of Executive Order 13662 Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List
7/16/2014
Today, OFAC is introducing the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List to identify persons operating in sectors of the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13662. Directives found within the list describe prohibitions on dealings with the persons identified.
Specially Designated Nationals List Update
In addition, the following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
BESEDA, Sergey (a.k.a. BESEDA, Sergei; a.k.a. BESEDA, Sergei Orestovoch); DOB 1954; Commander of the Fifth Service of the FSB; Commander of the Service for Operational Information and International Communications of the FSB; FSB Colonel General; Colonel-General (individual) [UKRAINE2].
BORODAI, Aleksandr (a.k.a. BORODAI, Alexander); DOB 25 Jul 1972; nationality Russia (individual) [UKRAINE].
NEVEROV, Sergei Ivanovich (a.k.a. NEVEROV, Sergei; a.k.a. NEVEROV, Sergey); DOB 21 Dec 1961; POB Tashtagol, Russia; Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation; Member of the State Duma Committee on Housing Policy and Housing and Communal Services (individual) [UKRAINE2].
SAVELYEV, Oleg Genrikhovich; DOB 27 Oct 1965; POB St. Petersburg, Russia; Minister for Crimean Affairs (individual) [UKRAINE2].
SHCHEGOLEV, Igor (a.k.a. SHCHYOGOLEV, Igor Olegovich); DOB 10 Nov 1965; POB Vinnitsa, Ukraine; alt. POB Vinnytsia, Ukraine; Aide to the President of the Russian Federation (individual) [UKRAINE2].
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
DONETSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, Donetsk Region, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT (a.k.a. FEDERAL STATE UNITARY ENTERPRISE, STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT; a.k.a. FSUE SRPE BAZALT; a.k.a. STATE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE BAZALT), 32 Velyaminovskaya, Moscow 105318, Russia; Website www.bazalt.ru; Email Address moscow@bazalt.ru [UKRAINE2].
FEODOSIYA ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. FEODOSIA OIL PRODUCTS SUPPLY CO.; a.k.a. FEODOSIYA ENTERPRISE ON PROVIDING OIL PRODUCTS; a.k.a. FEODOSIYSKE COMPANY FOR THE OIL; a.k.a. THEODOSIYA OIL TERMINAL), Feodosiya, Geologicheskaya str. 2, Crimea 98107, Ukraine; Feodosia, Str. Geological 2, Crimea 98107, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN RADIO-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES (a.k.a. CONCERN RADIO-ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES; a.k.a. “KRET”), 20/1 Korp. 1 ul. Goncharnaya, Moscow 109240, Russia; Website http://www.kret.com; Registration ID 1097746084666 [UKRAINE2].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN SOZVEZDIE (a.k.a. JSC CONCERN SOZVEZDIE), 14 Plekhanovskaya Street, Voronezh, Russia; 14 ul. Plekhanovskaya, Voronezh, Voronezhskaya obl. 394018, Russia; Registration ID 1053600445337 [UKRAINE2].
JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA (a.k.a. JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CONSORTIUM NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA; a.k.a. JSC MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA; a.k.a. MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIA JSC; a.k.a. MIC NPO MASHINOSTROYENIYA JSC; a.k.a. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION NPO MASHINOSTROENIA OAO; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY MILITARY INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION MACHINE BUILDING ASSOCIATION; a.k.a. VOENNO-PROMYSHLENNAYA KORPORATSIYA NAUCHNO-PROIZVODSTVENNOE OBEDINENIE MASHINOSTROENIYA OAO; a.k.a. VPK NPO MASHINOSTROENIYA), 33, Gagarina St., Reutov-town, Moscow Region 143966, Russia; 33 Gagarin Street, Reutov, Moscow Region 143966, Russia; 33 Gagarina ul., Reutov, Moskovskaya obl 143966, Russia; Website www.npomash.ru; Email Address export@npomash.ru; alt. Email Address vpk@npomash.ru; Registration ID 1075012001492 (Russia); Tax ID No. 5012039795 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 07501739 (Russia) [UKRAINE2].
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY (a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY CORP; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY DEFENSE CORPORATION; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY JSC; f.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO KONTSERN PVO ALMAZ ANTEI), 41 ul.Vereiskaya, Moscow 121471, Russia; Website almaz-antey.ru; Email Address antey@almaz-antey.ru [UKRAINE2].
KALASHNIKOV CONCERN (a.k.a. CONCERN KALASHNIKOV; a.k.a. IZHEVSKIY MASHINOSTROITEL’NYI ZAVOD OAO; f.k.a. IZHMASH R&D CENTER; f.k.a. JSC NPO IZHMASH; f.k.a. NPO IZHMASH OAO; a.k.a. OJSC CONCERN KALASHNIKOV; f.k.a. OJSC IZHMASH; f.k.a. SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION IZHMASH JOINT STOCK COMPANY), 3, Derjabin Pr., Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic 426006, Russia; Registration ID 1111832003018 [UKRAINE2].
KONSTRUKTORSKOE BYURO PRIBOROSTROENIYA OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO (a.k.a. INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. JSC KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU; a.k.a. KBP INSTRUMENT DESIGN BUREAU JOINT STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. “KBP OAO”), 59 Shcheglovskaya Zaseka ul., Tula 300001, Russia; Website www.kbptula.ru; Email Address kbkedr@tula.net; Registration ID 1117154036911 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 07515747 (Russia) [UKRAINE2].
LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC (a.k.a. LUGANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC; a.k.a. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF LUHANSK), Luhansk Region, Ukraine [UKRAINE].
URALVAGONZAVOD (a.k.a. NAUCHNO-PROIZVODSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. NPK URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. NPK URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. OJSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD; a.k.a. RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION URALVAGONZAVOD OAO; a.k.a. URALVAGONZAVOD CORPORATION; a.k.a. “UVZ”), 28, Vostochnoye shosse, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovsk region 622007, Russia; 28 Vostochnoe shosse, Nizhni Tagil, Sverdlovskaya oblast 622007, Russia; 40, Bolshaya Yakimanka Street, Moscow 119049, Russia; Vistochnoye Shosse, 28, Nizhny Tagil 622007, Russia; Website http://www.uvz.ru/; alt. Website http://uralvagonzavod.com/; Email Address web@uvz.ru [UKRAINE2].
Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List Update
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List:
GAZPROMBANK OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; Email Address mailbox@gazprombank.ru; Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497; Government Gazette Number 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662].
OAO NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO-INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. NOVATEK), 2, Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22 A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion, Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email Address novatek@novatek.ru; Registration ID 1026303117642 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 33556474 (Russia) [UKRAINE-EO13662].
OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Moscow 115035, Russia; Website www.rosneft.com; alt. Website www.rosneft.ru; Email Address postman@rosneft.ru; Registration ID 1027700043502 (Russia); Tax ID No. 7706107510 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 00044428 (Russia) [UKRAINE-EO13662].
VNESHECONOMBANK (a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA; a.k.a. “VEB”), 9 Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Moscow 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM; Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address info@veb.ru; BIK (RU) 044525060 [UKRAINE-EO13662].
В Донецке наступила эра Стрелка.
9 Jul 2014С приходом в Донецк ополченцев Стрелкова жизнь в городе заметно изменилась. Суровые бойцы, прошедшие огонь и воду, начали наводить в столице Донбасса свой порядок
— Не убили их еще?
— Да нет, лежат вон, а левее — видишь, милиция на «семерке» сидит, ждет, чем закончится… 
Хорошо одетая женщина вдумчиво общалась с охранником кафе возле донецкого торгового комплекса «Маяк». Было воскресенье, бойцы Стрелкова уже сутки находились в Донецке, и в данный момент они «разбирались» с местными гопниками.
Как объяснили очевидцы, в парикмахерскую напротив зашли люди (не в камуфляже! — Прим. Д.Д.) и начали забирать у женщин дневную выручку. Кто-то быстро позвал гулявших ополченцев, и те так же быстро вытащили грабителей на улицу и начали бить их прикладами по голове рядом с пустой детской площадкой. Я нарвался на эту картину на этапе, когда грабители уже превратились в «глубоко потерпевших граждан».
Ополченцев вокруг было много. Около сотни их отправилось на радиорынок, скупая подержанные телефоны и сим-карты. Выполняли приказ командования: сменить все, чтобы украинская разведка не отслеживала по телефонам марши.
Вооруженный народ из Славянска для Донецка выглядит диковинно. Ну, как армия хорошо и долго повоевавшей страны. Форма не всегда по размеру, народ все больше немолодой, битый и мятый жизнью. В Донецке ополчение совсем другое — не сильно воевавшее, чистое, крутое. И обстановка в городе совсем не славянская и даже не горловская. Легитимный мэр — на своем месте, работает гражданская администрация, высаживают розы, ремонтируют дороги, вывозят мусор…
Невооруженным взглядом заметны какие-то взаимные договоренности. Например, никто не трогал здания и предприятия Рината Ахметова. А когда один из митингов повернули сходить пешком к резиденции Ахметова — уговаривать толпу приехал лично премьер-министр ДНР Бородай, а батальон «Оплот» без всяких уговоров с автоматами стал на защиту дома президента ФК «Шахтер».
Ну а потом случился бой возле областного УВД. Люди горловского полевого командира Безлера почему-то пошли на нешуточный штурм. Начальник УВД генерал Пожидаев (возглавлял до своего назначения в марте службу безопасности одного из холдингов Ахметова) с немногими бойцами принял бой. Когда среди милиционеров появился убитый и раненые, в тыл Безлеру ударил… батальон «Восток» Александра Ходаковского. Под УВД с автоматом был замечен все тот же Бородай, который чуть позже объявил стычку «антитеррористической операцией» ДНР против никому не подчиняющегося Безлера.
Надо понимать, что, в отличие от никому не подчиняющегося Безлера, генерал Пожидаев вполне себе подчиняется министру МВД Украины Арсену Авакову. И никто его в предатели не записывал. После этого боя разговоры о том, что отдельным батальонам ДНР платит Ахметов, усилились донельзя.
А тут — Стрелков. Пришел без спросу, тут же занял под штаб отель «Донбасс Палас», объявил себя военным комендантом города. Начались разговоры о подчинении всех разрозненных батальонов под общее военное руководство, о «зачистке» несогласных и предателей…
Если честно, в Донецке сейчас больше боятся боев внутри ДНР, чем снаружи.
АТО вполне предсказуема. Как сообщили источники оттуда неделю назад, существует план окружения города — с запада на юг и дальше. Так все и происходит. Бои возле Карловки, в Песках, вокруг Марьинки…
Сейчас из города относительно свободно можно выехать в сторону Мариуполя и в Россию — через Макеевку на Успенку. Блокады еще нет.
Мэр Донецка в понедельник был в командировке в Киеве — поехал деньги у Минфина выбивать. А панно с государственным флагом Украины с горсовета сняли еще в пятницу — по причине ремонта фасада, как сообщила пресс-служба…
Статья – Дмитрий Дурнев Московский Kомсомолец №26566 от 8 июля 2014 – Dmitry Durnev Moskovskij Komsomolets
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in Brussels signed the Association Agreement with the European Union. The signing is a milestone. Whether history records June 27 as Ukraine’s “most important day” since it regained independence in 1991—as Mr. Poroshenko suggested—remains to be seen. Much depends on implementation of the agreement. 
The economic pact comes months after deadly protests broke out this winter when then-Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych — ousted by demonstrators in February — decided not to sign the trade deal under pressure from Moscow.
Georgia and Moldova also signed association agreements with the EU in a move opposed by Russia. Georgia has already lost chunks of its territory and Black Sea coast to rebels backed by Russia after a brief war with Russia in 2008.
“There will undoubtedly be serious consequences for Ukraine and Moldova’s signing,” Grigory Karasin, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said.
The Association Agreement can be a game-changer for Ukraine. It includes a deep and comprehensive free trade arrangement (DCFTA) that will open much of the European market to Ukrainian exports. Implementation of the agreement will not only bring Ukraine’s trade and customs rules into conformity with EU standards, it will help the country draw closer to EU democratic norms and “Europeanize” other Ukrainian regulatory regimes.
The Association Agreement lacks a membership perspective
For the European Union, signature of the association agreement with Ukraine (as well as signature of similar pacts with Georgia and Moldova) represents a significant step forward in its Eastern Partnership policy.
For the Kremlin, signature of the Ukraine-EU association agreement represents a setback. Vladimir Putin last December offered $15 billion in loans, with no overt strings attached, and a huge gas price cut to turn Ukraine away from signing.
1. Гарантии безопасности для всех участников переговоров.
2. Освобождение от уголовной ответственности тех, кто сложил оружие и не совершил тяжких преступлений.
3. Освобождение заложников.
4. Создание 10 км буферной зоны на российско-украинской государственной границе. Вывод незаконных вооруженных формирований.
5. Гарантированный коридор для выхода российских и украинских наемников.
6. Разоружение.
7. Создание в структуре МВД подразделений для осуществления совместного патрулирования.
8. Освобождение незаконно удерживаемых административных зданий в Донецкой и Луганской областях.
9. Возобновление деятельности местных органов власти.
10. Обновление центрального теле- и радиовещания в Донецкой и Луганской областях.
11. Децентрализация власти (путем избрания исполкомов, защита русского языка, проект изменений в Конституцию).
12. Согласование губернаторов до выборов с представителями Донбасса (при условии согласования единой кандидатуры, при разногласиях – решение принимает Президент).
13. Досрочные местные и парламентские выборы.
14. Программа создания рабочих мест в регионе.
15. Восстановление объектов промышленности и социальной инфраструктуры
Ukraine situation: Australia designates 50 persons and 11 entities subject to Australia’s autonomous sanctions
On 19 June 2014 the Autonomous Sanctions (Designated Persons and Entities and Declared Persons – Ukraine) List 2014 (the Ukraine List) commenced.
The Ukraine List gives effect to announcements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 19 March and 21 May 2014 to impose targeted financial sanctions and travel bans against persons and entities responsible for, or complicit in, the Russian threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The 50 persons and 11 entities named in Schedule 1 of the Ukraine List satisfy the criteria in regulation 6 of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 to be designated for targeted financial sanctions or declared for travel bans. The details of these persons and entities have been published in the DFAT Consolidated List.
Further information: Ukraine sanctions page
La crisi ucraina è una mina nelle relazioni est-ovest. Per alcuni Paesi – ad esempio Germania, Francia ed Italia – rischia di avere anche pesanti ripercussioni, considerando l’alto grado di sviluppo dei rapporti economici con Russia ed Ucraina. 
L’obiettivo di trovare una qualche soluzione rapida diventa col passare delle settimane e dei mesi una vera esigenza per limitare i danni. La complessità della crisi non consente l’utilizzo di percorsi semplici, ma serve un intervento globale a largo respiro e, se necessario, il coraggio di scelte non convenzionali.
* * *
Sono principalmente tre i livelli su cui agire:
1. mediazione tra Mosca e Kiev; 2. riformulazione dei rapporti bilaterali Russia-Ue; 3. ridefinizione delle relazioni Russia-Nato.
* * *
1. L’accordo per un cessate il fuoco si scontra con l’attuale necessità delle parti di giungere ad una futura trattativa da posizioni di forza. Soltanto l’invio di unità dei Paesi dell’Osce, l’Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa, può evitare in Ucraina orientale un bagno di sangue. Un qualche negoziato può iniziare sulla base di concessioni, messe per iscritto, del governo centrale in materia di autonomia regionale. Ma servirà una mediazione esterna, apprezzata sia da russi che da ucraini.
Per la Crimea, sono necessari, invece, approcci non convenzionali. Altrimenti la penisola contesa si troverà stritolata dal presente conflitto.
2. La presa di coscienza della reciproca necessità e dei vantaggi incommensurabili di una collaborazione fruttifera tra Russia ed Ue è la base di partenza. Le 4 macroaree su cui sono imperniate le relazioni bilaterali sono state superate dagli eventi. Urge una più ambiziosa riformulazione dei rapporti con passi significativi, ad iniziare dall’abolizione immediata dei visti.
3. L’architettura di Pratica di Mare è entrata in crisi. Il coinvolgimento di Mosca nella questione delle difese anti-missilistiche in Europea è la chiave di volta per la sicurezza continentale.
* * *
Cosa rischia l’Italia?
Siamo davanti ad un cambiamento geostrategico, comparabile a quello avutosi nel XVI secolo.
1. Nella precedente architettura l’Italia era destinata a diventare un “hub” energetico. La costruzione del Nord Stream per il consorzio russo-tedesco, quella già avvenuta in precedenza del Blue Stream verso la Turchia e la futura del South Stream consegnava al BelPaese una posizione invidiabile.
In futuro gli approvvigionamenti dello shale gas dagli Stati Uniti, che giungeranno nei porti dell’Atlantico, allontaneranno l’Italia dalle grandi rotte dell’energia, rischiando di annacquare il valore di un “partner strategico” come la Russia.
2. Il volume degli scambi commerciali ed industriali – rivelatisi fondamentali negli ultimi anni per le medie e piccole imprese italiane – con Russia ed Ucraina rischia di ridimensionarsi.
La Presidenza semestrale italiana dell’Unione europea dal 1 luglio 2014 è un’occasione che non va assolutamente sprecata.
Giuseppe D’Amato
The leader of the Crimean Tatars Mustafa Dzhemilev received the Solidarity Prize from Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski on the day the country marks 25 years since the end of communism. 
New Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, US secretary of State Kerry, Swedish minister of Foreign Affairs Bildt, former Polish President Lech Walesa took part at the ceremony.
Mustafa Dzhemilev was banned from entering Russian territory, including the recently annexed Crimea, after he condemned the March referendum.
On Monday evening Dzhemilev told Polish public television station TVP that the Crimean Tatars would continue to fight for their rights.
“We are not going to wage war against Russia, We have not shed anyone’s blood, We will fight for our rights with peaceful means.” he said.
Dzhemilev, like the vast majority of Crimean Tatars, was deported from his homeland in 1944, and he grew up in Uzbekistan, where he was involved in dissident activities. He returned to Crimea in 1989.
“For years, Mustafa Dzhemilev has been promoting democracy and civil rights and civil liberties in Ukraine, specifically among the Tatar community,” Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said.
“The people of Ukraine made a very good choice, I have known Petro Poroshenko for many years,” said Dzhemilev of the presidential elections of 25 May.
“He is a patriot, an honest man, even though a businessman. It is very important for me that he said that the most important matter is to free Crimea from the occupation. Without being released from the occupation, we cannot imagine how we will be able to live on,” he added.
From Polskie Radio, TVP
Mustafa Dzhemilev’s battle for Crimea – Deutsche Welle
Il vento è cambiato in Ucraina. Con la scelta di un presidente, legittimato dall’investitura popolare addirittura senza il ballottaggio, il presunto vuoto di potere a Kiev è stato colmato. La Russia ha per questo, almeno parzialmente, cambiato il proprio approccio alla crisi, dopo aver ritirato le truppe dalla frontiera la settimana prima delle elezioni.
La fase – definiamola “militare regolare” -, è per il momento chiusa. Invadere “ufficialmente” il Donbass e la regione di Lugansk sarebbe un inutile suicidio politico – diplomatico. Mosca erediterebbe realtà socio-economiche difficilissime, che necessitano di rilevanti investimenti finanziari. Che ci pensi l’Europa a prendersi un tale fardello!” 
Il Cremlino ora mira ad incassare gli oltre due miliardi di dollari di forniture di gas non pagate dagli ucraini, che, dal canto loro, sono disposti sì a saldare il conto, ma soltanto in cambio di un futuro prezzo equo. Altrimenti Kiev si rivolgerà al Tribunale arbitrale di Stoccolma e la Gazprom sarà costretta ad aspettare i suoi soldi ancora chissà quanto.
La Russia ha adesso non poco da perdere: il vantaggio accumulato nelle settimane post deposizione di Janukovich è finito. Ecco la ragione delle timide aperture diplomatiche di queste ore. Mosca, però, non vuole mediatori occidentali tra i piedi. La ragione è semplice: gli europei hanno colpe enormi nello scoppio della crisi; i ministri degli Esteri polacco, francese e tedesco hanno garantito il 20 febbraio scorso un accordo per la sopravvivenza politica di Janukovich, sconfessato dagli eventi dopo manco una notte.
La diplomazia russa ha quindi iniziato una mini-offensiva con contatti a più livelli. Il presidente Putin ha parlato al telefono con Matteo Renzi. L’Italia avrà dal primo luglio la presidenza di turno semestrale dell’Ue. Il Cremlino si attende un aiuto dagli storici partner per uscire da questo pantano.
Giuseppe D’Amato
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